This paper characterizes a set of Nash equilibria in a first-price sealed-bid repeated auction with the right of first refusal using two bidders and asymmetric information regarding the bidders' value distributions. When contract value is constant from one auction to the next and winners' values are publicized, agents retain the value of incumbency and bids are identical to one-shot auctions. When each agent's contract values are random across auctions, agents choose to bid away the full expected value of incumbency, providing a measure of the value of information in this context.
Introduction
Many contractual arrangements that entail repeated interactions include a right of first refusal, which allows a current contract holder to retain a contract by matching the largest bid of a competing bidder. Examples include employment contracts, especially for athletes and entertainers; procurement contracts such as those for municipal garbage collection or cable television service; contracts for undeveloped land, residential, and commercial property; and some National Parks concession contracts.
Contracts with the right of first refusal can usually be characterized as a form of repeated auction, defined in this article as an infinite series of auctions used to award the same indivisible object in each period. Repeated auctions have been studied since Demsetz (1968) called for the use of franchise bidding to award monopoly contracts.
The importance of the treatment of the incumbent contract holder in the results of repeated auctions is seen in Osmundsen (1996) , in which repeated auctions are applied to nonrenewable resource extraction franchises, and in Laffont and Tirole (1998) as incumbent's make investment choices in the first period.
In the first economic analysis of the right of first refusal, Kahan (1999) models the value of the right of first refusal in negotiated contracts (not auctions), and shows that the value of the right will depend on the relative valuations of the good. Additional theory and an experimental examination of the right of first refusal is presented in Grosskopf and Roth (2004) , who conclude that the specific characteristics of the right of first refusal can work either in favor of or against the incumbent.
Others examine the market impacts of including the right of first refusal. Walker (1999) argues that the right of first refusal protects against bargaining breakdown and inhibits exit from a market, but it also may limit competitive bidding. Bikhchandani et al. (2005) discuss the impacts of the right of first refusal on the seller and potential buyers, and conclude that the right is inefficient (the bidder with the highest value does not necessarily win), and the seller may forego surplus relative to auctions without the right of first refusal. Finally, Chouinard (2005) compares one-shot first-price auctions with and without the right of first refusal in the context of U.S. National Parks concession contracts.
This article is the first to model first-price repeated auctions with the right of first refusal. Our model builds upon Bikhchandani et al. (2005) and Chouinard (2005) . We consider repeated rounds of bidding, with two bidders in each period. Initially, contract values are assumed constant over time for each agent, and the winners' values are revealed during contract incumbency. The model is then extended to consider a case in which private contract value is also stochastic across time for each agent, such that the incumbent's assessment of the value of the next contract is not known publicly at bidding time, and the value of future contracts are not known with certainty by any agent. A comparison of the equilibrium bidding strategies for these two informational settings show that when future values are unknown by everyone, bids are higher; the difference being a measure of the value of information from the bidder's perspective. This modeling approach also suggests why sellers might include the right of first refusal in repeated auction contracts.
In the next section we develop the general auction setting with the right of first refusal. The subsequent two sections develop the specific cases, and the final section provides a comparison and concludes.
Right of First Refusal bidding environment
At the beginning of each period, a seller offers for bid a monopoly right for one period. The largest bid wins the monopoly right for that period. The winner transfers her bid amount to the seller, and retains the value of the monopoly right for that period. In each period there are two bidders, and agents may hold different contract valuations in different rounds.
1 Contract value for each agent is independently drawn from a standard uniform distribution, and this distribution is common knowledge among agents. The actual value of a contract in any given period is private knowledge until and unless this value is revealed through the auction process, and no collusion of any form exists among bidders.
2 The timing of the repeated auction process is as follows:
1. First round: Each agent i privately draws contract value v i t at time t, and then they simultaneously bid. The agent with the largest bid wins the contract and becomes the incumbent for the next round.
1 Changes in contract value across periods can be interpreted in two ways: bidders may change from period to period, or bidders draw new valuations in each period.
2 Repeated auctions are often assumed to include the same bidders in each period, and numerous articles therefore examine collusion among repeat bidders as an important aspect of the repeated auction process (Phillips et al. 2003 , Fabra 2003 , Aoyagi 2003 , Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn 2004 . However, the length of the awarded contracts or the characteristics of the object often make the assumption of a changing pool of entrant bidders more realistic. In this present work, we therefore in effect allow entrant's to change across periods, and assume no collusion.
2. Subsequent rounds: Each agent privately draws v i t . The entrant submits a bid first, then the incumbent either matches the entrant's bid and remains the incumbent, or declines to match. If the incumbent declines, the entrant becomes the incumbent and retains the right of first refusal for the subsequent round. The two scenarios examined below differ in how contract values for a given agent change over time.
The payoff function for agent i in period t can be characterized as the present value of the initial contract plus the expected value of future contracts as an incumbent. This expected value for agent i in period t conditional on winning the first round bid can be written as
where 
respectively. This is a convenient and common distributional assumption in the auction literature.
In the first scenario developed below, each agent draws a contract value prior to the initial period and retains this value for all subsequent auctions. In the second scenario, each agent draws a new contract value prior to bidding in each successive auction. This change in assumption leads to substantially different bidding strategies and buyer/seller welfare distribution.
Contract value constant over time
In this scenario, each agent independently draws v i t = v i prior to the first round auction from a standard uniform distribution with support [0,1]. This value is constant over time for each agent, although incumbents need not face the same challenger (entrant) in subsequent periods. The winner's value becomes common knowledge. This is similar to Vickrey (1961) , where it is assumed one bidder knows the valuation of the other. Landsberger et al. (2001) ] cannot be interpreted as the value of the right of first refusal, because even if the incumbent did not have the right of first refusal, there would be some probability that that current contract holder would win the subsequent auction as well. We use the term "expected value of future incumbency" to mean the net expected value of future contracts for a given agent. first price auctions given the ranking of bidder valuations is known. They suggest that knowledge about incumbent's values may also come from previous auction experience, access to others' financial resources, or other idiosyncratic features of bidders. In the types of auctions considered here, it is reasonable that entrant bidders may be able to observe the incumbent, as one period of the repeated auction may last several years. This may allow entrants to discover the incumbent's contract value even if winning bid values are hidden.
One practical implication of this information structure is that an entrant bidding against an incumbent will not submit a meaningful bid unless she will win the contract. Without further contractual rules, having no challenging bid would allow the incumbent to renew her contract with some arbitrarily small bid and extract virtually all rents from the seller. It is therefore assumed that the seller will not accept a bid from an incumbent lower than the bid with which she first won the contract. In this setting, entrant and incumbent bids are relatively straightforward, and will be formally characterized after deriving the bid functions for the initial auction.
First round bids
We assume two symmetric agents each begin the first auction with a privately known contract value v i 0 = v i . Agent 1's first period problem is to maximize the expected value of bidding, which is the expected value of a contract times the probability of winning it:
To proceed, we must characterize the probability of agent 1 outbidding agent 2 (Pr[b , from the perspective of the first round. In this environment, an incumbent's bids will be constant for the duration of her tenure because a) an entrant will bid only if she will win, and b) incumbents must bid at least their initial bid but have no incentive to bid more than their initial bid. It follows that for each period, an incumbent will receive v I − b I until she loses the incumbency, where b I is the bid that initiated the agent's incumbency (either in the first or a subsequent round). Further, because an agent's contract value is constant over time, the expected value of incumbency is constant over time such that E[U
The probability of an incumbent winning one (additional) auction is the probability that her bid is larger than an entrant's bid, and this will happen if her expected value of incumbency is greater than that of a challenging entrant.
Because contract value and an incumbent's bid are constant over time, the incumbent's value of future incumbency is at least as large as an entrant's value of future incumbency iff v E ≤ v I . Given known v I and a standard uniform distribution for v E , the probability that an incumbent wins in any given period is Pr[b
For the first period bid, characterizing the probability that agent 1 outbids agent 2 (Pr[b 
After substituting the right-hand-side of equations 3 and 4 and rearranging, the initial bidder's problem in equation 2 becomes
The first-order condition with respect to b 1 0 for this maximization problem is 
In this initial auction the two bidders are symmetric, so each bidder i will bid
and the highest value will win the auction in the first period.
5
Because v 1 is the gross value of the first-period contract, the result indicates that the winner retains one half of the first-period contract value and the entire present value of incumbency. Interestingly, this result is identical to a one-shot first-price auction.
Entrant and incumbent bidding strategies
For subsequent rounds given this environment, the entrant and incumbent bids are relatively straightforward. Equation 3 implies that the value of winning an auction conditional on winning it is The entrant knows this, and also knows the incumbent's contract value at bidding time (due to the information revelation from the incumbent's first win). An entrant will bid only if v E > v I + ε, where ε is an arbitrarily small positive value. The optimal entrant bid is therefore
An entrant will bid only if she knows she can win. If no entrant bids, the incumbent submits her previous bid as required by the seller. Therefore, the incumbent's initial bid of b
will stand for each subsequent period until an entrant with a higher contract value unseats the incumbent. 
Uncertain future contract value
Now we allow contract value to differ over time for each agent. At the beginning of each period, individuals privately draw v i t from independent and identical standard uniform distributions, and then submit their bids.
6 Thus, each agent knows her own current contract value at bidding time, but has only symmetric information about the distribution of future period values. A fundamental difference in this scenario is that the value of future incumbency is independent of any agent's current bid. The expected value of being an incumbent is first derived below, followed by the objective function and the bid function of an entrant, which is more complicated than in the previous scenario. The bid function for initial bidders is derived last.
Entrant's bid
The entrant's problem is
which is the entrant's analogue to equation 2, and represents the present value of the initial contract plus the expected value of future contracts as the incumbent all multiplied by the probability the current incumbent will not match the entrant's bid. The elements E[U ] ≡b E , both of which are conditional on the sampling distributions of future contract values, which are common knowledge among agents. Given constantŪ I and the fact that the incumbent's bid follows a standard uniform distribution, the probability of winning from the entrant's perspective is
6 These can be thought of as predictions for period t contract value upon which agents base their bids. 
The expected value of future incumbency is
Based on equation 9,P I in equation 13 is
Figure 1: Expected value of future incumbency (eq. 15). Plugging the right-hand-side of equation 14 into equation 13 and solving for U I provides:
The right-hand side of equation 12 is then substituted into equation 15, and solved again forŪ I . This value can then be used in the optimal bid function given in equation 11.
8 Figure 1 shows the expected value of incumbency as a function of expected entrant bids. As the expected entrant bid increases, the expected value of incumbency declines. Figure 2 shows the expected value of a contract from the entrant's perspective (with known v Given these values, the expected entrant bid in future periods is 0.4423; the discounted expected value of incumbency (δŪ I ) is 0.1923; the optimal entrant bid is 0.4423, and the expected net value of an entrant bidding on a contract is 0.0625. If the entrant's current contract value were 0.75, then the entrant's optimal current bid would be 0.5673, with an expected value of winning the current contract would be 0.1406 7 There are actually two solutions, because equation 13 is quadratic inŪ I after the substitution of equation 9. The only economically meaningful solution is that which is a declining function ofb E , because the expected value of incumbency must decline as the expected entrant bid increases.
8 Mathematica c code and results are available from the authors upon request.
First-round bidding
Given that E[U 
A solution to this differential equation is
By definition the inverse bid function is alsoσ(b 
Thus, in the first round and the entrant's bid in subsequent rounds, an agent bids (and therefore the seller receives) all of the expected value of incumbency and one half of the current contact value. This result is in contrast to the previous case in which only one half of the value of the current contract is bid, and the winning bidder retains the full value of incumbency. It is perhaps surprising that the bid functions in this second case are identical for first-round bidders (equation 20) and for entrants in subsequent bids (equation 11). The reason is that differences in both the benefits and costs of increasing the bid exactly offset each other given our functional forms. At the optimal bids, a first-round bidder has twice the chance of winning than does an entrant bidding against an incumbent, so the marginal expected cost of increasing the bid is twice that of an entrant.
On the other hand, an increase in a first-round bid also increases the probability of winning by twice as much as an increase in an entrant's bid. A competing first-round bidder increases her bid by one-half of the current contract value v i 0 , a value that also corresponds to the cumulative density of v i 0 . Given this uniform distribution, it follows that the change in the probability of winning with respect to a one unit change in the bid is two. On the other hand, the incumbent will match an entrant's bid one-for-one unless the entrant wins, so an increase in an entrant's bid increases the probability of winning by one unit rather than two units. The first-round bidder faces double the marginal cost, and double the marginal benefit, of a higher bid. The result is identical bidding strategies for the first and subsequent rounds. 
Conclusions
This article examines repeated auctions with the right of first refusal. The optimal bid functions for first-period bidders, entrants, and incumbents are derived for two different cases. The first case assumes that contract values differ across agents but not over time, and the second case assumes that contract value is stochastic across agents and over time for each agent. Although this difference in assumptions may at first glance appear innocuous, it requires substantially different solution approaches; especially to derive the optimal bids of entrants challenging an incumbent.
These two cases also highlight the value of information and its distributional effects. When agents know their private contract values into the future and the incumbent's value of the contract, initial bidders choose to bid only one half of their initial period contract value, so if they win, they retain one half of the first period's contract value plus the entire expected value of incumbency beyond that. In contrast, when an agent's future valuations are stochastic such that all agents know each agent's distribution, each agent knows their value prior to the current auction, but no one knows their future contract values, 10 The inverse bid function for the entrant would beσ(b E t ) = b E t , so thatσ (b E t ) = 1. Applying these values to first-order condition 17 gives first-order condition 11. Mathematically, the reason the two bid functions are identical is because the inverse bid function is linear in the bid. then initial bidders bid away the entire value of future incumbency in addition to half of the first-period value. Thus, sellers are better off (and initial bidders are worse off) when agents do not know the incumbent's contract value. When entrants know the incumbent's contract value, incumbents are unseated only by agents with higher contract values, but otherwise retain their initial bid of one-half of their contract value. In contrast, entrant's facing temporally stochastic contract values bid away all of their net present value of winning beyond the current contract in hopes that this bid will be higher than the net present value of the incumbent for that period.
Our results also show that sellers may want to include the right of first refusal in contracts to extract more of the surplus from the contract. Given our modeling framework without the right of first refusal, each period would effectively amount to a one-shot game with optimal bids v i /2. In our constant value case, initial bidders will bid the one-shot game bid v i /2, but in the second period, entrants will bid the incumbent's value v I , which will most likely be more than the one-shot game bid. Further, with each subsequent turnover the bids will ratchet up to the upper bound of the support as the winning bidder's value increases. In the uncertain contract value case, bidders bid away all or part of the value of incumbency in every period, so that the bids (and therefore the seller's revenue) are always higher than without the right of first refusal.
In some instances such as sports contracts, the right of first refusal is often introduced into contracts by an initial bidder. This makes sense because future entrants will bear the burden of the right. It is also worth noting that profit maximization may not be the only objective to motivate including the right of first refusal in contracts. Government officials may value consistency of service or other provider characteristics best met with less turn-over.
